RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE : l’insaisissable lien de causalité.

Par David Éthier

Le jugement de la Cour d’appel dans Maison Jean-Yves Lemay Assurances inc. c. Bar et spectacles Jules et Jim inc., 2016 QCCA 1494, rendu le 19 septembre 2016, constitue un bel exemple des difficultés que pose la notion de lien de causalité. La Cour est d’ailleurs divisée sur le résultat, mais le jugement demeure intéressant; et, en particulier, le problème juridique dont il était question.

Bar Jules et Jim inc. (« Bar ») est propriétaire d’un immeuble qu’il assure à hauteur de 424 000 $. En prévision du renouvellement de son assurance, Bar consulte son courtier, La Maison Jean-Yves Lemay Assurances inc. et Louis-Charles Warren (collectivement « Warren »), et l’informe qu’il souhaite s’assurer pour la pleine valeur de reconstruction de son immeuble. Warren lui recommande alors d’obtenir une nouvelle évaluation de cette valeur et, à cette fin, Bar mandate l’évaluateur Gérard Légaré (« Légaré »).

Légaré conclut que la valeur de reconstruction s’établit à 565 000 $ et transmet son rapport à Bar, qui le transmet ensuite à Warren. Ce dernier tarde toutefois à communiquer l’information à l’assureur et, entre-temps, l’immeuble est ravagé par le feu.

À la suite de cet incendie, Bar reçoit 424 000 $ de son assureur et intente des procédures judiciaires contre Warren et Légaré afin de leur réclamer l’excédent de son coût de reconstruction.

En première instance, le Juge Clément Samson, J.C.S. conclut que Légaré a commis plusieurs fautes dans son évaluation et que, sans celles-ci, il aurait évalué le coût de reconstruction de l’immeuble à 798 865 $. Le Juge conclut toutefois que Warren a aussi commis plusieurs fautes, dont la plus importante, subséquente à celle du Légaré, consiste en le fait de n’avoir pas fait le suivi auprès de l’assureur pour que la couverture soit augmentée. Ultimement, le Juge détermine que Warren doit être tenu seul responsable du préjudice de Bar puisque, peu importe les fautes de Légaré, « le dommage serait le même, car le courtier (Warren) n’aurait pas davantage réagi adéquatement. ».

Devant ce résultat, Warren se pourvoit en appel. Le débat est toutefois circonscrit, les parties ne remettant pas en cause les conclusions du Juge à propos du préjudice de Bar et des fautes respectives de Légaré et Warren. Ainsi, la seule question en appel vise à déterminer si Warren doit être effectivement tenu responsable pour l’ensemble du préjudice ou si Légaré doit assumer la portion de ce préjudice qui « découle » de ses propres fautes.

En réponse à cette question, la Juge en chef, dissidente, conclut dans le même sens que le Juge de première instance. Tout comme lui, elle met l’emphase sur les fautes de Warren et, en particulier, son défaut d’avoir communiqué la nouvelle évaluation à l’assureur :

[35]        Supposant que l’évaluateur ait ici remis un rapport exemplaire, ne contenant aucune erreur, cela n’aurait eu aucun impact sur les dommages subis par l’assuré, le courtier n’ayant nullement utilisé le contenu de ce rapport pour faire quoi que ce soit. La faute de l’évaluateur n’a tout simplement jamais fait partie de la trame des évènements. Elle est plutôt invoquée après coup par le courtier qui tente ainsi de réduire sa propre responsabilité pour avoir omis d’agir selon son mandat.

Puis, poursuivant son analyse, elle ajoute que le préjudice de Bar était parfaitement prévisible pour Warren étant donné que son mandat impliquait qu’il dût obtenir une couverture adéquate pour son assuré et que la prévisibilité devait être appréciée au moment de la conclusion du contrat (donc avant l’obtention de l’évaluation).

À l’inverse, la majorité de la Cour (Juges Savard et Émond) conclut que Warren ne saurait être tenu responsable de l’ensemble du préjudice de Bar et que Légaré doit assumer sa part de responsabilité :

[76]        Le juge estime que la faute du Courtier, subséquente à celle de l’Évaluateur, a eu pour effet de rompre le lien de causalité, de sorte que la responsabilité de ce dernier ne peut être engagée. Selon lui, même si le rapport d’évaluation avait été exempt d’erreurs, le résultat aurait été le même vu le défaut du Courtier de le transmettre en temps à l’assureur en vue d’obtenir un ajustement de la couverture d’assurance. Il estime donc que le Courtier est le seul responsable des dommages subis par l’assurée.

[77]        Avec égards, cette façon d’aborder le problème est erronée. (…)

[78]        Le Courtier et l’Évaluateur ont commis des fautes distinctes, qui ne sont cependant pas simultanées. Chacune d’elles participe aux dommages de l’assurée et peut être reliée à un dommage individuel précis. Aucune d’elles ne peut, à elle seule, provoquer l’entièreté des dommages subis par Bar Jules et Jim. (…)

[82]        Ainsi, l’obligation principale à laquelle le Courtier fait défaut est celle de transmettre diligemment à l’assureur le rapport de l’Évaluateur, tel que reçu, en vue de faire augmenter la couverture d’assurance selon la valeur inscrite au rapport. Un courtier prudent et diligent aurait demandé et obtenu cette couverture et aurait de ce fait respecté ses obligations envers l’assurée. (…)

[83]        Dès lors, le préjudice résultant de la faute du Courtier consiste en la différence entre la couverture existante (424 000 $) et celle qu’elle aurait été s’il n’avait pas commis le geste fautif (565 000 $), représentant 141 000 $. (…)

[85]        De son côté, la faute de l’Évaluateur participe, de façon distincte, aux dommages de l’assurée. Celui-ci fait défaut d’évaluer l’immeuble selon les règles de l’art. Il est seul imputable de cette évaluation et des erreurs qu’elle contient (sous réserve des frais de démolition), le Courtier n’étant pas responsable du montant de couverture que l’assurée, via l’évaluateur dont il retient les services, demande. N’eût été la faute de l’Évaluateur, le courtier prudent et diligent aurait demandé et obtenu une couverture d’assurance au montant de 798 865 $ (incluant les frais de démolition, selon l’admission des parties). Il s’agit là d’une autre conclusion de fait du juge de première instance qui n’est pas contestée devant la Cour.

[86]        L’Évaluateur est dès lors responsable des dommages découlant de sa propre faute. Ceux-ci consistent en la différence entre le montant de l’évaluation n’eût été sa faute (798 865 $) et celui de l’évaluation erronée (565 000 $), soit 233 865 $. Ce dernier montant doit par ailleurs être réduit afin de tenir compte des frais de démolition déjà payés par le Courtier (45 200 $), laissant ainsi un solde de 188 665 $.

[87]        Le fait que le Courtier n’a jamais transmis le rapport erroné ou demandé une augmentation de la couverture d’assurance sur la base de ce rapport n’a pas pour effet d’absoudre l’Évaluateur pour sa faute. On ne peut y voir là une « véritable rupture du lien causal, justifiant de décharger le premier auteur de la faute et de ne retenir que la responsabilité du second ». Dans Lacombe et al. c. André et al., le juge Baudouin précise la condition essentielle pour conclure à une telle rupture :

[59] […] Il faut, dans un premier temps, constater l’existence d’arrêt complet du lien entre la faute initiale et le préjudice, et, dans un second temps, la relance ou le redémarrage de celui-ci en raison de la survenance d’un acte sans rapport direct avec la faute initiale. Il ne peut en effet, en toute logique, y avoir de rupture lorsqu’il y a continuité dans le temps et donc rattachement causal des fautes l’une à l’autre.

[88]        En l’occurrence, cette condition essentielle n’est pas respectée. (…)

[89]        Imputer au Courtier la responsabilité de l’ensemble des dommages subis par l’assurée aurait pour effet de lui faire assumer ceux découlant de la faute exclusive de l’Évaluateur. Avec égards, une telle conclusion est contraire aux principes de la responsabilité civile.

L’analyse de la majorité est intéressante en ce qu’elle approche le problème d’un angle différent, soit en se rapportant aux principales obligations des parties dont l’inexécution était ici en cause. Ainsi, Légaré devait évaluer l’immeuble selon les règles de l’art, tandis que Warren devait transmettre l’évaluation diligemment à l’assureur et s’assurer que la nouvelle couverture d’assurance tiendrait compte des conclusions de celle-ci. Sous ce rapport, il semble effectivement que le fait de retenir uniquement la responsabilité de Warren reviendrait à lui faire supporter le poids d’une obligation qui n’était pas sienne. Bref, s’il est vrai que la faute de Warren avait le potentiel de causer tout le préjudice de Bar (dans l’éventualité où Légaré n’avait pas lui-même commis de faute), il n’en demeure pas moins qu’en l’espèce, la faute de l’un et de l’autre pouvait être reliée à une portion déterminée du préjudice, qu’il convenait de leur faire assumer de manière correspondante.

En terminant, que vous soyez d’accord ou non avec le résultat, le jugement de la Cour dans cette affaire est une lecture obligée si la question du lien de causalité vous intéresse!

Applications to Disqualify Lawyers: The Superior Court guards against Abuse

By Emma Lambert

In the latest judgment resulting from the legal saga of Trackcom Systems Inc. v. Trackcom Systems International Inc., 2016 QCCS 4389, the Honourable Michel A. Pinsonnault, J.S.C., confronted the issues of the disqualification of an attorney and the abuse of procedure.

In this case, the defendants’ application in disqualification was directed against the plaintiffs’ attorneys, specifically M^e Ari Y. Sorek, as well as other members of his law firm Dentons Canada s.e.n.r.l, after M^e Sorek had signed a sworn declaration in support of the plaintiffs’ application to homologate a transaction which had been filed following the rupture in protracted settlement negotiations between the parties. In their application, the defendants alleged that M^e Sorek’s testimony was essential to the determination and adjudication of the application to homologate the transaction and that they had the “absolute right”[1] to examine him. In response, the plaintiffs countered by requesting that the court declare the application in disqualification to be abusive pursuant to article 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).

In his judgment, Justice Pinsonnault applied the relevant legislative provisions governing applications in disqualification, specifically section 76 of the Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers[2] and article 193 CCP[3] and recalled that the mere right to examine a lawyer acting for the opposing party, even if it is an “absolute right”, does not justify their disqualification  in and of itself. Dismissing the defendants’ application in disqualification, Justice Pinsonnault stated the following:

[55] Sorek cannot be disqualified simply on the basis that he will undoubtedly be called as an essential witness given his personal involvement in the transaction that is the object of the Motion to homologate. Such an involvement would trigger a multitude of disqualifications, as more often than not, such transactions are concluded directly between lawyers acting for their respective clients. Given such a direct involvement of lawyers, it is not surprising that they would execute sworn declarations in support of motions to homologate such transactions. Again, the “absolute right” to examine them on their sworn declarations does not automatically entail their disqualification without the other criteria being met as well.

[56] Although the lawyers for the Defendants claimed that Sorek could not avail himself of one of the exceptions of section 76 of the Code of conduct, the mere fact that one party may wish to examine the lawyer of the opposing party is not sufficient in itself to warrant a disqualification.

[57] One must bear in mind that Article 193 C.p.c. stipulates that a lawyer may only be declared disqualified for serious cause if he is called to testify in the proceeding on essential facts. [Emphasis added]

[58] With all due respect, the lawyers for the Defendants failed to convince the Court that any of the various criteria developed by the jurisprudence to disqualify a lawyer find application in the present instance.

[59] Firstly, the jurisprudence on disqualification of lawyers shows that in such circumstances, the facts of each case are important and must be assessed by the Court. “En matière de déclaration d’inhabilité, les faits importent. Chaque cas est un cas d’espèce.[4]”

[…]

[61] Although the notion of the appearance of a conflict of interest must always be the first and foremost part of the Court’s preoccupations, the Court called upon to disqualify a lawyer, especially when based on his or her upcoming testimony at or before trial, must be guided, inter alia, by the right of a litigant to choose his or her counsel and that fundamental right must not be overridden except for serious and compelling reasons[5]. [Emphasis added]

[…]

[63] Based on the foregoing principles, the Defendants also failed to make a probable case that the testimony of Sorek is necessary and essential in order that they be able to present a full defence to the Motion to homologate.

[64] Moreover, of particular importance in the present case, the Defendants, via their lawyers, had a “duty to try to arrive at an accommodation that would avoid the need for such testimony”, if it was at all possible. They never even attempted to do so.

Furthermore, with respect to the plaintiffs’ request to declare the application in disqualification to be abusive, Justice Pinsonnault determined that there was “no doubt in [the Court’s] opinion” that the application in disqualification was abusive under article 51 CPC. Justice Pinsonnault outlined that:

[92] Given the nature of the issues at stake in the Motion to homologate, the Motion to disqualify was not warranted at all. Again, a frank and courteous discussion between the opposing lawyers would have easily established the nature of the evidence to be adduced on each side with respect to the Motion to homologate and the absence of necessity to examine Sorek at this juncture of the proceedings.

[93] The Motion to homologate could have already been pleaded and disposed of within less time that it took for the present motions.

[94] Based on the evidence available to the Court, it can conclude that in all likelihood, the Motion to disqualify prepared while the lawyers were negotiating and in the absence of any prior warnings and discussions, served one purpose for the Defendants, retaliate against the Plaintiffs who refused their proposed terms and conditions of settlement and delay as much as possible the presentation of the Motion to homologate and by the same token the entire legal proceedings.

[95] But that was not all; the Court file also reveals that from the outset, the Plaintiffs have claimed to be at a significant financial disadvantage vis-à-vis the Defendants’ economic power.

[96] The Court emphatically agrees with Sorek that the other goal likely sought by the Defendants with their Motion to disqualify was to force the Plaintiffs to abandon the present proceedings for lack of financial resources in the event that Sorek and Dentons were disqualified. Under such a scenario, the Plaintiffs having lost their lawyers would have found themselves in the obligation to find new counsel. The current state of the proceedings that so far have lasted four years without an end in sight and with already four presences before the Court of appeal, without mentioning the complexity of the commercial issues raised in the context of the present oppression remedy case, would have rendered prohibitive the cost of bringing a new lawyer up to speed. In all probabilities, it would have indeed forced the Plaintiffs to abandon their case without ever having submitted the same to a judge on its merits.

[97] Had they succeeded in their ploy, the Defendants would have been able to defeat the ends of justice.

Consequently, Justice Pinsonnault sanctioned the defendants and ordered them to pay the plaintiffs extrajudicial fees in the amount of $10,000 and reserved their right to claim punitive damages if the abusive conduct of the defendants continued to persist in the conduct of the proceedings.

---

[1] Translation of “le droit strict”.

[2] 76. A lawyer must not personally act in a dispute if he knows or should know that he will be called upon as a witness.

However, he may act:

(1) if the fact of not acting is of a nature to cause serious prejudice to the client; or

(2) if his testimony only refers to:

(a) an uncontested matter;

(b) a question of form and there is no reason to believe that serious proof will be offered to contradict such testimony; or

(c) the nature or value of the professional services rendered by him to the client or, as the case may be, by another professional who engages in his activities within the same firm.

[3] 193. On a party’s application, a lawyer may be declared disqualified to act in a proceeding, as when the lawyer is in a conflict of interest situation and does not take steps to remedy it, has disclosed or is likely to disclose confidential information to another party or a third person, or is called to testify in the proceeding on essential facts. In the latter case, the lawyer may only be declared disqualified for serious cause.

[4] Cogismaq International inc. v. Lafontaine, 2008 QCCA 2044, par. 26.

[5] Cinar Corporation v. Weinberg, 2006 QCCS 4601, par. 10.

LES DOMMAGES RÉCLAMÉS POUR CAUSE DE CONCURRENCE DÉLOYALE RÉDUITS SUITE À L’ACCUEIL D’UNE DEMANDE DE DÉCLARATION D’ABUS

Par Julien Lussier

En mars 2014, le défendeur Leblanc démissionne de son poste de directeur régional de la demanderesse, Muskoka Minerals & Mining Inc. (« Muskoka »). En avril 2014, il fonde, avec la défenderesse Sablières Chevrier et Fils inc. (« Chevrier ») – qui était jusqu’en décembre 2013 le principal fournisseur en agrégat (sable) de Muskoka – la défenderesse Soltek Agrégats Inc. (« Soltek »). Peu de temps après, Soltek débute ses activités de vente d’agrégat, faisant du même coup concurrence à Muskoka.

Avant sa démission, Leblanc avait également incorporé la défenderesse 9260-2556 Québec Inc., spécialisée dans les services d’excavations et de mise en place d’agrégats. Au moment de sa démission, Leblanc n’était lié par aucune clause de non-concurrence. Quant à Chevrier, elle n’était liée par aucune clause d’exclusivité en faveur de Muskoka.

La demanderesse intente un recours à l’encontre des quatre défendeurs, leur réclamant solidairement 1 447 189,90$. Le fondement de la demande découle de la prétendue violation, par Leblanc, de son obligation de loyauté, et de la complicité des autres défendeurs. Muskoka reproche également à Chevrier d’avoir cessé d’être son fournisseur.

C’est dans ce contexte que les défendeurs présentent une Demande en déclaration d’abus à l’encontre de la demande de Muskoka, afin de faire déclarer que les dommages réclamés sont exagérés et abusifs, et soustraire certains des défendeurs à quelques-unes de conclusions qui ne les concernent manifestement pas.

La Cour supérieure, sous la plume de l’honorable juge Catherine Mandeville, accueille en partie la demande des défendeurs. D’une part, celle-ci juge que même la jurisprudence la plus généreuse en matière de devoir de loyauté ne fait pas survivre celui-ci au-delà d’une période de quelques mois, et que les pertes de profits alléguées par Muskoka - si elles devaient être établies – ne devraient tout au plus couvrir qu’une période de douze (12) mois suivant la démission de Leblanc :

[24] Le Tribunal est d’avis que l’ampleur des dommages réclamés pour perte de profits bruts est nettement exagérée, car elle résulte d’estimations fondées sur la prémisse que Muskoka aurait le droit de bénéficier d’une période de quatre ans sans concurrence. Ceci ne peut se justifier au regard du droit applicable et il y a lieu d’exiger de la Demanderesse qu’elle réduise sa réclamation de façon à ce qu’elle se limite à une perte de bénéfices et des dommages en raison d’une concurrence exercée sur une période de 12 mois à compter du départ de l’employé Leblanc, soit de mars 2014, à mars 2015. 

[25] En effet, l’ampleur du montant réclamé pas Muskoka entraîne des difficultés de financement à Soltek ainsi qu’à son actionnaire Leblanc personnellement. Cette réclamation est abusive en ce qu’elle vise une indemnisation pour une période de quatre ans sans concurrence, ce qui est exorbitant de l’état du droit en une telle matière. Au surplus, en raison du montant élevé réclamé, cette réclamation crée des difficultés de financement à l’entreprise, limitant ses opportunités de lui faire concurrence.

Poursuivant son analyse, la Cour se penche ensuite sur certaines des conclusions qui, selon les défendeurs, ne concernent pas l’ensemble de ceux-ci. Leur donnant raison sur ce point, la Cour reconnaît que :

[31] […] Dans la Demande, aucun allégué ne permet de soutenir que Chevrier, Soltek ou 9260 aient commis de faute dans le cadre du contrat de « Fleurs-O-Pavé ». Ces trois Défendeurs n’ont aucunement participé à la réalisation de ce contrat. La Demande devrait plutôt viser seul Leblanc, puisque c’est lui qui aurait commis une faute, alors qu’il était toujours à l’emploi de Muskoka. Il ne s’agit donc pas de concurrence déloyale. Il n’est pas possible d’avancer à la lumière des faits allégués qu’il y ait solidarité, même imparfaite, entre les Défendeurs, car aucune faute ne leur est reprochée. La Demande devra être amendée en conséquence.

La Cour suit également le même raisonnement pour soustraire la défenderesse 9260-2556 Québec Inc. de la réclamation pour perte de profits, estimant que cette dernière, en raison du fait qu’elle opère dans un secteur d’activité distinct, ne peut avoir contribué à la prétendue concurrence déloyale.

How Representative Do You Have To Be?

By Catherine McKenzie

In the last couple of years, there have been a series of judgments in Quebec on the certification of class actions which have denied certification in part because of the quality of the proposed representative plaintiff. An example of such a judgment – and one that contained important statements regarding the appropriate role of counsel in class actions – was Justice Yergeau’s decision in Sibiga v. Fido Solutions, (2014) QCCS 3235. That decision has been overturned in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Sibiga v. Fido Solutions inc. (2016 QCCA 1299) penned by Justice Kasirer.

That decision overturned Justice Yergeau’s analysis (which had been rendered before the Supreme Court’s decision in Infineon) on several issues, but the one that I will concentrate on here regards the representative Plaintiff.

The background of this case is well summarized by the Court of Appeal:

[17]      The appellant is a Quebec consumer who has a wireless telephone contract with Fido Solutions Inc. In September 2012, she used her mobile phone on approximately six occasions to access the Google Map service through the internet while travelling on holiday in the United States. She had chosen not to avail herself of a pre-paid travel plan offered by Fido that would have entitled her to a reduced rate for roaming mobile data services outside of Canada. As a result, she was billed on a pay-per-use basis for 40.82 megabytes (MB) of roaming data used at a rate of $6.14 per MB. According to her monthly account summary, she owed $250.81 for the roaming data used in the United States in addition to the amount of her usual monthly invoice.

[18]      The appellant says she was disagreeably surprised at the additional amount charged at the time but paid it without complaint.

[19]      In December 2012, she received a mass email from the law offices of Trudel & Johnston announcing that the Montreal firm had undertaken an investigation of international roaming fees charged to Quebec consumers using their wireless mobile devices. The firm had been examining the viability of a consumer class action based on unfair international roaming fees before they met the appellant. The email invited consumers who had received bills they considered to be excessive to contact the firm. The appellant did so shortly thereafter.

[20]      With Trudel & Johnston acting on her behalf, the appellant filed a motion for authorization to institute a class action and obtain the status of representative in the Superior Court on January 8, 2013. The named defendants were Fido, Rogers Communications Partnership, Bell Mobility Inc. and Telus Communications Company.

[21]      In the motion, the appellant alleges that the respondents had charged international roaming fees to Quebec consumers that are disproportionate and exploitative, in violation of section 8 of the Consumer Protection Act. The contracts between consumers and the named wireless service providers are also alleged to be abusive within the meaning of article 1437 C.C.Q. The core claim of the class action is stated in paragraph 2.19: “[…] the available evidence at this stage clearly demonstrates that the underlying cost of providing international mobile roaming data represents a minuscule fraction of the retail rates charged by the Respondents and that such retail rates are disproportionate, exploitative, and abusive”.

[22]      The appellant claimed that the facts alleged gave her an individual right of action, as a consumer, against Fido, the wireless service provider with whom she was a subscriber, and also gave rise to actions on behalf of class members who contracted with the other respondents. (Rogers and Fido are related companies). The class is described in the motion as follows:

Tous les consommateurs qui résident au Québec et à qui les Intimés ont chargé des frais d'itinérance pour les données à un taux excédant 5,00 $ par mégaoctet après le 8 janvier 2010.

All consumers residing in Quebec who were charged international mobile data roaming fees by the Respondents at a rate higher than $5.00 per megabyte after January 8, 2010.

[23]      By way of redress on the merits, the appellant sought a declaration that international mobile data roaming fees charged by the respondents violate the CPA and article 1437 C.C.Q. She sought to reduce the amounts payable for the international roaming fees to an amount equal to their fair market value as well as an order to compensate her and other members of the class for the amounts overcharged. Finally, she asked for collective recovery of punitive damages. (Our emphasis)

Justice Yergeau had found that the proposed representative plaintiff could not adequately represent the group because of the manner in which she had been recruited to serve as representative plaintiff and her lack of knowledge regarding the claim:

[98]      The judge found that the appellant was not in a position to represent members of the class adequately for two reasons. First, she had an insufficient interest in the suit because of the lead taken by counsel in planning and instituting the class action. The judge read the reference to adequate representation in article 1003(d) as an indication by the legislature that the role of the representative must be “au-delà de la simple figuration” (para. [140]) and more than a “simple présence passive” (para. [148]). The lawyers recruited the appellant and, according to the judge’s view of things, she would not have any meaningful authority to withdraw their mandate if she lost confidence in their conduct of the case. Secondly, he found that the appellant lacked competence to act as representative for the class as a whole. Her testimony during the examination on discovery indicated that she has an insufficient understanding of the class action that had been instituted in her name. The judge made special mention of one of her answers suggesting she did not understand the calculation of $5 per MB charged that is the basic measure for membership in the class.

Justice Kasirer agreed with the Appellant that these were not sufficient reasons to find that the proposed representative wasn’t adequate. On the issue of class counsel’s role, Justice Kasirer wrote:

[102]    While it is not inappropriate to be mindful of possible excesses of what some have described as “entrepreneurial lawyering” in class actions, it is best to recognize that lawyer-initiated proceedings are not just inevitable, given the costs involved, but can also represent a social good in the consumer class action setting. As Perrell J. wrote in one Ontario case, “the entrepreneurial nature of a class proceeding can be a good thing because it may be the vehicle for access to justice, judicial economy, and behaviour modification, which are all the driving policy goals of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992”. Scholars have observed that, within the proper limits of ethical rules that bind all lawyers, courts should recognize that lawyer-initiated consumer class actions can be helpful to meet the access to justice policy goals of the modern law of civil procedure. In my view, the fact that lawyers play an important, even primary role in instituting a consumer class action is not in itself a bar to finding that the designated representative has the requisite interest in the suit. Where the personal stake of a consumer representative is small – here, the appellant was charged $250.81 for roaming, of which only a portion is alleged to be overpayment – it is often unrealistic to insist upon a consumer-initiated class action.

[103]    A lawyer-initiated consumer class action is not inherently incompatible with an acceptable solicitor-client relationship, nor does it mean that the client has “no control” over counsel. Article 1049 C.C.P. requires that a lawyer act for the representative. In our case, the appellant retains the authority to walk away from the class action, with permission of the court, and the lawyers cannot unilaterally “dismiss” the client as representative of the class. The judge was wrong to suggest that the fact that the lawyers chose their client here means that the appellant is an inadequate representative. As my colleague Dufresne, J.A. wrote in Fortier:

[147]   Cela dit, les juges peuvent déceler, à l’occasion, des indices qui laissent croire que les démarches ayant donné naissance à la requête portent fortement l’empreinte des avocats, mais cela ne discrédite pas nécessairement celui ou celle qui fait valoir une cause d’action qui apparaît suffisamment sérieuse alors que, sans lui, le groupe serait privé de l’exercice d’un droit.

[104]    Nothing in the record suggests that the appellant is not a genuine claimant and nothing suggests unethical conduct on the part of her counsel, either in the “investigative” stage of the case or after proceedings were instituted. I see nothing that would disqualify her by reason of the implication of her lawyers. In my view, denying her that status for that reason appears to contradict the policy basis upon which class actions are founded. If lawyers’ role is to be reconfigured in this setting, it strikes me that article 1003(d), as drafted, is not a sound basis for achieving that end. (Emphasis added)

On the issue of whether she was competent to represent the class adequately because of her knowledge of the claim, Justice Kasirer wrote:

[106]    The judge was harsh in his evaluation of the appellant’s comprehension of the class action. She misunderstood “un élément capital du syllogisme élaboré par les avocats” in that she did not grasp the means of calculating the $5 per MB threshold for membership in the class action (para. [155]). For the judge, the appellant’s mistake on this point “touche à l’essence” of the class action, and signalled that she did not understand “le raisonnement développé par les avocats au dossier” (para. [157]). She could not therefore offer adequate representation to members of the class.

[107]    Here again, respectfully stated, I find myself unable to agree with the judge.

[108]    It is best to recognize, as does the appellant herself in written argument, that she may not have a perfect sense of the intricacies of the class action. This is not, however, what the law requires. As one author observed, Quebec rules are less strict in this regard that certain other jurisdictions: not only does the petitioner not have to be typical of other class members, but courts have held that he or she “need not be perfect, ideal or even particularly assiduous”. A representative need not single-handedly master the finery of the proceedings and exhibits filed in support of a class action. When considered in light of recent Supreme Court decisions where issues were equally if not more complicated, this is undoubtedly correct: in Infineon, for example, the consumer was considered a competent representative to understand the basis of a claim for indirect harm caused down the chain of acquisition for the sale of computer memory hotly debated by the economists; in Vivendi, the issue turned on the unilateral change by the insurer of in calculations of health insurance benefits to retirees and their surviving spouses; in Marcotte, the debate centered on currency conversion charges imposed by credit card issuers. It would be unrealistic to require that the representative have a perfect understanding of such issues when he or she is assisted, perforce, by counsel and, generally speaking, expert reports will eventually be in the record to substantiate calculations of what constitutes exploitative roaming fees.

[109]    To my mind, this reading of article 1003(d) makes particular sense in respect of a consumer class action. Mindful of the vocation of the class action as a tool for access to justice, Professor Lafond has written that too stringent a measure of representative competence would defeat the purpose of consumer class actions. After reviewing the law on this point, my colleague Bélanger, J.A. observed in Lévesque v. Vidéotron, s.e.n.c., a consumer class action, that article 1003(d) does not impose an onerous burden to show the adequate character of representation: “[c]e faisant, la Cour suprême envoie un message plutôt clair quant au niveau de compétence requis pour être nommé représentant. Le critère est devenu minimaliste”. In Jasmin v. Société des alcools du Québec, another consumer action, Dufresne, J.A. alluded to the Infineon standard and warned against evaluations of the adequacy of representation that are too onerous or too harsh, echoing an idea also spoken to by legal scholars.

[110]    In keeping with the “liberal approach” to the interpretation of article 1003(d), especially suited with the consumer class action, it suffices here that the appellant understand, as she has alleged, that she was billed a disproportionate amount for roaming because of the unfair difference between the amount charged and the real cost of the service to the respondent Fido. She must know that, like herself, others in the class, whether roaming in the U.S. or elsewhere, were also disproportionately billed, either with her own service provider or others who offer like services to Quebecers. She of course must see that her claim raises common questions with others in the class and that she is prepared to represent their interest and her own going forward.

[111]    The examination before plea suggests that she had this understanding:

Q.      [12] O.k. And when you say «the reason for being here», can you expand on that a little?

A.      Sure. Well, basically what has happened to me and what, I know that it happens quite often to a lot of people, is that I was charged very a large sum of money for roaming fees when I went away for a week to the United States last year and I basically, I mean, you know, I've used my phone a certain way, I knew that I was going to, you know, get charged a little bit but when I received my bill, it was, I was extremely shocked to see, you know, the actual, the bill that I was expected to pay. And this is why, when I heard from Bruce approached me about this, that's why I immediately came forward because it was, I think a lot of people basically have this situation happening to them every month. So that's why I'm here.

[112]    In addition, the appellant’s testimony indicates that she has a clear understanding of wireless services and international roaming data. She understands too that in order to succeed, she will have to establish the cost of roaming services and is prepared to join counsel in making efforts to obtain this information.

[113]    In my respectful view, the judge failed to apply the liberal standard called for by the Supreme Court, both by misapprehending the consequences of counsel’s initiatives and by requiring a level of understanding of the claim that is too harsh for a consumer class action. This is not an instance in which the adequacy of the representative is compromised in a manner that, to revert to the Infineon standard quoted above, “could not possibly proceed fairly”. Indeed, neither the judge nor the respondents in their arguments on appeal advance any serious suggestion that the fairness of the class action was threatened by the recognition of the appellant as class representative. Moreover, if ever the appellant were considered to no longer be in a position to represent the class members properly, the law provides a mechanism whereby she could be replaced by another member of the class at a later stage in the proceedings.

Finally, Justice Kasirer addressed a point raised by Respondents counsel regarding the impact that the decision of the Supreme Court in Marcotte on the issue of interest might have on whether a representative is considered adequate:

[115]    As a final point, counsel for the respondents argued that given the change in the law relating to standing since Marcotte, the rules on adequate representation in article 1003(d) should be more strictly enforced. In service of this argument, they point to dicta in the judgment of this Court in Marcotte where Dalphond, J.A. suggested that article 1003(d) stood as a protection against unmanageable or unfounded class actions against unconnected defendants. Indeed, one might argue that the adequacy of representation, as well as the common question requirement, might prove to be especially important on the facts of a given case where there are members of the class who, unlike the representative, have no direct cause of action against one or another defendant. But a new reading of articles 1003(a) and 1003(d) C.C.P. cannot be proposed in a manner that would revive the standing debate that Marcotte has put to rest. It might also be recalled in this context that Quebec does not have a typicality test for the representative, and that article 1003(d) should not be interpreted to create one. What is important, in the present case, is that the appellant plainly understood the allegation that, like her, consumers with other service providers paid for that service at unfair rates. And as we shall see in the next section, the common question requirement was met for all members of the class, including those with Telus or Bell contracts. (Emphasis added)